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1. Introduction
The Child and Dependent Care Credit (CDCC), a tax credit based on income and child care
expenses, subsidizes child care costs for working families. The federal CDCC is available to
households with children younger than 13 in which all parents have positive annual earnings.
While many families meet these criteria, from its introduction in 1976 through 2020, the
CDCC was nonrefundable, so only families with positive tax liability after other deductions
benefited. As low-income households tend to spend a higher proportion of their income on
child care (Herbst 2018) and researchers show that the CDCC promotes work participation,1
many policymakers advocated making the credit refundable. In response to the COVID-19
pandemic, the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 made the CDCC refundable and increased
its generosity during tax year 2021 only. In this paper, I estimate how CDCC eligibility,
benefits, and marginal tax rates would change for different groups if the credit were made
permanently refundable. I describe changes in outcomes and incentives that arise solely from
changes in tax policy, relative to CDCC parameters as of 2020, which are set to be restored in
2022. The results are the first step in understanding the effects of a permanently refundable
CDCC.
I first examine the maximum federal CDCC benefits that households may receive across
the income distribution. Under the nonrefundable CDCC, the maximum benefit for house-
holds with two or more qualifying dependents is about $1,500 per year, and households with
adjusted gross income (AGI) below $18,650 are ineligible for benefits because they do not
have any tax liability. If the CDCC were made permanently refundable, low-income house-
1See Averett, Peters, and Waldman (1997); Guner, Kaygusuz, and Ventura (2020); Michalopoulos,
Robins, and Garfinkel (1992); Miller and Mumford (2015); and Pepin (2020).
1
holds could gain eligibility and receive up to 35 percent of AGI, to a maximum of $2,100 per
year, in benefits.
While making the CDCC permanently refundable would encourage child care spending
and labor force participation, it would generate complex intensive margin labor supply in-
centives. I therefore characterize marginal tax rates as a consequence of federal individual
income taxes and tax benefits targeted at families with children, including the CDCC. I
show that making the CDCC permanently refundable would decrease marginal tax rates
substantially for very-low-income families. For example, marginal tax rates would decrease
by 35 percentage points among single parents with one eligible dependent, the maximum
qualifying child care expenditures, and less than $3,000 in AGI. Refundability, however,
would increase marginal tax rates for taxpayers with slightly higher incomes. In particular,
marginal tax rates for similar parents with $25,000 to $33,000 in AGI would increase by over
10 percentage points.
Given different effects of refundability across the income distribution, I also study the
extent to which actual taxpayers would benefit from a permanently refundable CDCC using
data from the 2018 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). I show that, all else
equal, making the CDCC permanently refundable would lead to relatively large increases
in eligibility among single-parent, Black, and Hispanic households, which are all less likely
to qualify for the nonrefundable credit. Specifically, some 3 percent of Black households,
2 percent of Hispanic households, and 1 percent of white households would gain eligibility,
all else equal. About 5 percent of single parents would gain eligibility and would receive
on average over $1,000 in benefits annually. This increase is substantial, constituting 18
percent of existing child care spending and 10 percent of AGI. As expected, marginal tax
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rates with respect to income would increase for some moderate-income taxpayers, all else
equal. Nevertheless, increases in marginal tax rates with respect to income are small relative
to decreases in marginal tax rates with respect to child care expenditures, which could
mitigate intensive margin labor supply disincentives.
Finally, I show that, all else equal, making the CDCC permanently refundable would
increase government spending each year by about $800 million, or 21 percent of CDCC
spending during the late 2010s. Although an $800 million increase in spending is considerable
relative to recent years, it would restore spending levels that have decreased over time, as
the CDCC is not indexed to inflation.
In the following section, I provide institutional details and document CDCC eligibility and
benefits with and without refundability. In Section 3, I characterize how making the CDCC
permanently refundable would affect marginal tax rates. In Section 4, I use data from the
2018 SIPP to show how refundability would affect CDCC eligibility, potential benefits, and
marginal tax rates across income and demographic groups. In Section 5, I estimate effects of
refundability on government spending. In Section 6, I discuss implications of refundability
on state child care credit programs. In Section 7, I conclude.
2. Institutional Details and CDCC Generosity
Congress implemented the federal CDCC in 1976 and expanded it in 1981 and 2001. The
latter expansion took effect in 2003, and between 2003 and 2020, households were able to
claim up to $3,000 worth of child care expenses per year for each of up to two children
younger than 13. Such households could receive a tax credit worth up to 35 percent of those
expenses, or $1,050 per child. Beginning at $15,000 in AGI, the benefit rate decreased by
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1 percentage point for each additional $2,000 until it remained at 20 percent for those with
$43,000 or more in AGI, who could receive up to $600 per child in benefits. The CDCC,
however, was nonrefundable, so taxpayers without positive tax liability were ineligible. The
credit is not indexed to inflation.
Moreover, CDCC claimants must work to qualify for benefits, including both spouses
among married taxpayers filing jointly. Additionally, if either spouse’s earnings are less
than child care expenditures, then the CDCC is calculated as a percent of the lesser of
the two taxpayers’ earnings. Almost any child care expenditures are eligible for the credit,
except care provided by a noncustodial parent. To claim the credit, taxpayers must list
their earnings, child care expenditures, and child care providers’ tax identification or Social
Security numbers on federal Form 2441. Benefits decrease taxes due at tax filing time.
Nonrefundability generates a difference between statutory and effective, or actual, bene-
fits received. I therefore use the tax filing thresholds, AGI levels at which taxpayers begin
to have positive tax liability, to document maximum effective CDCC benefit schedules with
and without refundability in Figure 1. Specifically, the figure displays benefits for single
parents with one or two or more eligible dependents and the maximum qualifying child care
expenditures as of 2020. In the online appendix, I show that maximum effective CDCC
benefit schedules for married parents, who receive larger standard deductions, are slightly
less generous but otherwise similar.2 I assume that single taxpayers file as head-of-household
and that, among taxpayers whose child care expenditures exceed income, all income comes
from earnings.3 The solid red line in Figure 1 shows effective CDCC benefits for taxpayers
2CDCC benefit schedules for taxpayers with lower child care expenditure amounts are less generous but
otherwise similar and also can be found in the online appendix.
3In the analyses, I use a smooth interpolation between adjacent CDCC benefit rates, whereas the tax
code prescribes a step function, to prevent discontinuities that result in marginal tax rates approaching
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with two or more eligible dependents under 2020 tax law. The nonrefundability of the credit
implies that taxpayers’ incomes must exceed the tax filing threshold of $18,650 to be eligible
for benefits. For taxpayers with incomes above this threshold, benefits increase with income
before reaching a peak of about $1,530 for taxpayers with $34,100 in AGI. Benefits then
decrease until they plateau at $1,200 for taxpayers with $43,000 or more in income.
The solid blue line in Figure 1 shows that if the CDCC were made permanently refund-
able, low-income taxpayers would receive larger benefits. In particular, for taxpayers with
two or more eligible dependents and less than $6,000 in AGI, refundable CDCC benefits
increase as income increases. Benefits then hold steady at $2,100 for those with $6,000 to
$15,000 in AGI. For taxpayers with AGI above $15,000, refundable benefits steadily fall as
income increases until they converge with nonrefundable benefits and remain constant at
$1,200.
Taxpayers with one eligible dependent face less generous but otherwise similar maximum
effective CDCC benefit schedules. The dotted red and blue lines in Figure 1, which overlap
with the solid lines at low income levels, display nonrefundable and refundable CDCC ben-
efits, respectively, for single taxpayers with one child younger than 13. As with households
with two or more children, taxpayers with less than $18,650 in AGI are ineligible for CDCC
benefits under 2020 tax law. Nonrefundable benefits then increase until they peak at about
$860 for taxpayers with $27,600 in AGI. For taxpayers with higher incomes, benefits decrease
with income until they remain constant at $600 for those with $43,000 or more in AGI. The
dotted blue line shows that, similar to the schedule for taxpayers with two or more eligi-
infinity. Taxpayers likely respond to the interpolated marginal tax rates, as Chetty, Friedman, and Saez
(2013) provide evidence that workers who are not self-employed are unable to adjust their incomes within
small bins.
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ble children, refundable CDCC benefits increase with income for taxpayers with less than
$3,000 in AGI and peak at $1,050 for taxpayers with $3,000 to $15,000 in AGI. Refundable
benefits then decrease, eventually converging with nonrefundable benefits. Hence, Figure
1 shows that making the CDCC permanently refundable would increase generosity among
low-income taxpayers without affecting benefits for those with higher incomes.
Interactions with other elements of the tax code also affect CDCC generosity.4 For
instance, for some taxpayers, nonrefundable CDCC benefits directly offset benefits from the
Child Tax Credit (CTC), a partially refundable tax credit for families based on number of
children. Since 2018, households have been able to receive up to $2,000 per child younger
than 17.5 If the credit value exceeds the amount of tax a household owes, the household can
receive refundable benefits through the Additional Child Tax Credit (ACTC). The ACTC
is worth 15 percent of earnings over $2,500, up to a maximum of $1,400 per child. CTC
benefits decrease with income for single taxpayers with more than $200,000 and for married
taxpayers with more than $400,000.
Before calculating CTC benefits, taxpayers’ tax liability is reduced by several nonre-
fundable tax credits, including the nonrefundable CDCC. Therefore, taxpayers with positive
tax liability before claiming the CDCC but without positive tax liability after claiming the
CDCC become ineligible for the nonrefundable portion of the CTC but remain eligible for
the ACTC. Because the ACTC is limited to a percent of AGI over $2,500, however, non-
refundable CDCC benefits decrease CTC benefits for some taxpayers. If the CDCC were
made permanently refundable, these taxpayers’ CTC benefits could increase: refundable tax
4A refundable CDCC generally would not interact with government transfer programs that receive federal
funding because the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010
prohibits such programs from counting tax refunds as resources for at least 12 months after receipt.
5Taxpayers also may receive up to $500 per dependent aged 17–24 and per elderly dependent.
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credits come after nonrefundable tax credits on federal Form 1040, so CDCC benefits no
longer would affect tax liability used to calculate the CTC.
Table 1 illustrates interactions between the CDCC and CTC for hypothetical taxpayers.
In particular, Table 1 shows federal taxable income and CDCC and CTC benefits for tax-
minimizing single taxpayers with two eligible dependents, no additional children, and the
maximum qualifying child care expenditures as of 2020. The hypothetical taxpayers have
$10,000, $40,000, and $70,000 in income, which comes solely from earnings. Those with only
$10,000 in earnings do not have taxable income and do not benefit from the nonrefundable
CDCC or the nonrefundable portion of the CTC but receive $1,125 in ACTC benefits.
Consistent with Figure 1, if the CDCC were made permanently refundable, these taxpayers
would receive $2,100 in CDCC benefits. Taxpayers with $40,000 in earnings have taxable
income and receive $1,320 in nonrefundable CDCC benefits, $909 in nonrefundable CTC
benefits, and $2,800 in ACTC benefits. Although such taxpayers’ CDCC benefits would not
change under refundability, their CTC benefits would increase by $291 because the CDCC no
longer would affect tax liability used to calculate the CTC. Finally, taxpayers with $70,000 in
earnings receive $1,200 in nonrefundable CDCC benefits and $4,000 in nonrefundable CTC
benefits. Because their tax liability is sufficiently high, these taxpayers’ benefits would not
change if the CDCC were made permanently refundable.
In addition, over 40 percent of workers have access to dependent care flexible spending
accounts (FSA) that their employers offer, which interact with CDCC benefits.6 Since 1986,
employees who receive FSAs from their employers have been able to set aside up to $5,000 of
6U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, National Compensation Survey: Employee
Benefits in the United States, March 2020, Table 40, “Financial benefits: Access, civilian workers, March
2020,” https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2020/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2020.pdf.
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earnings before taxes for dependent care expenses. The employer deducts this income from
employees’ paychecks, but employees are reimbursed for qualified child care expenses, which,
similar to the CDCC, include expenditures on care inside and outside of the home. Unlike
the CDCC, however, the decision to set aside funds for an FSA occurs before the employee’s
child care expenses are realized.
While taxpayers may receive benefits from both FSAs and the CDCC, they may not
double count expenses across the two child care subsidy programs. Before 2021, FSAs
generally provided larger tax benefits per dollar than the federal CDCC, given the CDCC’s
nonrefundability and high marginal tax rates among high-income taxpayers. Nevertheless,
families who spend over $5,000 per year on child care can benefit from both programs. In
addition, low-income families are relatively unlikely to have access to dependent care FSAs,
as only 20 percent of workers with wages in the bottom quartile are offered FSA benefits.
Table 1 shows the maximum FSA benefits that single taxpayers with two children could
receive at different income levels as of 2020. Potential FSA benefits increase with income as
taxpayers move into higher tax brackets. Specifically, taxpayers with $10,000, $40,000, and
$70,000 in earnings can receive up to $500, $600, and $1,100 in FSA benefits, respectively.
The CDCC also may interact indirectly with the EITC. Although CDCC benefits do
not affect EITC benefits directly, both tax programs promote work and redistribute income
toward working families with children. The EITC is a refundable tax credit targeted at
low- to moderate-income families. EITC benefits increase with household earnings until
they reach a maximum benefit level, $6,660 for families with three or more children as of
2020. Benefits then remain constant until household earnings reach another level, $19,330
for families with children as of 2020, at which point benefits begin to phase out toward
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zero. Table 1 shows that, as of 2020, taxpayers with $10,000 in earnings were ineligble for
the nonrefundable CDCC but received $4,000 in EITC benefits. Taxpayers with $40,000 in
earnings received $1,320 in CDCC benefits and $1,655 in EITC benefits. Taxpayers with
$70,000 in earnings received $1,200 in CDCC benefits but were ineligible for the EITC.7
Furthermore, 24 states and the District of Columbia supplement the federal CDCC with
their own refundable or nonrefundable state child care credits. Statutory maximum benefits
vary considerably across states, from $394 to $2,310 for families with two eligible dependents
as of 2020. Unlike the federal CDCC, however, some states offer refundable credits, limit
benefits to taxpayers with incomes below a certain threshold, or provide larger benefits to
low-income households. States generally calculate their benefits as a percent of the federal
CDCC received or the federal CDCC that the taxpayer would have received if the federal
credit were refundable. I consider how state supplements to the federal CDCC would affect
changes in benefits and marginal tax rates under permanent refundability in Section 6.
3. How Would Permanent Refundability Affect Incentives?
As a subsidy for child care, CDCC benefits encourage child care spending and effectively
increase wages net of child care costs. Since all parents must work to receive benefits, in-
creases in benefits promote labor force participation. However, the CDCC generates complex
7Though benefits are not administered through the tax code, the Child Care and Development Fund
(CCDF) provides states funding to administer child care subsidy programs to about 800,000 very-low-
income families, most of which are participating in or transitioning out of the Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families program. If the federal CDCC were made permanently refundable, CCDF subsi-
dies could decrease CDCC benefits for some very-low-income taxpayers by decreasing their out-of-pocket
child care expenses. Nonetheless, few households receive CCDF benefits, and subsidies often do not
cover all child care expenses. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Chil-
dren and Families, Office of Child Care, “Characteristics of Families Served by the Child Care and De-
velopment Fund (CCDF) Based on Preliminary FY2018 Data,” https://www.acf.hhs.gov/occ/resource/
characteristics-of-families-served-by-child-care-and-development-fund-ccdf.
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intensive margin labor supply incentives. In this section, I examine the effects of making the
CDCC permanently refundable on intensive margin labor supply incentives by comparing
marginal tax rates with respect to income with and without refundability. More specifically,
I simulate marginal tax rates as a consequence of federal individual income taxes and the
CDCC, CTC, and EITC—hereafter, family tax benefits—with and without refundability.
Accounting not only for the CDCC but also for other tax programs that affect families with
children allows interactions between the CDCC and other tax benefits to affect marginal tax
rates. This is particularly important when studying the effects of refundability on incentives,
as evidence documented in Section 2 shows that making the CDCC permanently refundable
would increase CTC benefits for some taxpayers.
Throughout the analyses, I document marginal tax rates separately across single and
married taxpayers, who receive different tax treatment. For instance, married parents receive
larger standard deductions and face lower individual income tax rates. Additionally, at low
income levels, CDCC benefits are a function of the lesser earner’s earnings. To estimate
marginal tax rates, I use tax code provisions and the National Bureau of Economic Research’s
TAXSIM program, which calculates individuals’ tax liabilities and tax credits, including their
family tax benefits under 2020 tax law. In doing so, I assume households tax-minimize, single
parents file as head-of-household, and married parents file jointly. I also assume all income
comes from earnings. For married parents, I document marginal tax rates for spouses with
equal earnings but find similar results for married parents with unequal earnings in the online
appendix.8
The left panel of Figure 2 shows marginal tax rates for single parents with one eligible
8Details of the simulation procedure can be found in the online appendix.
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dependent, no older children, and the maximum qualifying child care expenditures.9 The
black line displays marginal tax rates as a consequence of federal individual income taxes
and family tax benefits under 2020 tax law. Single taxpayers with less than $11,000 in AGI
face marginal tax rates as low as –0.39 because the EITC and CTC subsidize earnings at
low income levels. Marginal tax rates are substantially higher among taxpayers with slightly
higher incomes, however. For instance, taxpayers with about $14,000 to $19,000 in AGI face
a marginal rate of 0.12. Single taxpayers who fall in the phase-out region of the EITC have
some of the highest marginal tax rates; those with about $33,000 to $43,000 in AGI face a
marginal tax rate of 0.29, which exceeds that of taxpayers with over $85,000 in AGI.
The dashed line in the left panel of Figure 2 shows that, all else equal, making the
CDCC permanently refundable would decrease marginal tax rates by 35 percentage points
among single taxpayers with less than $3,000 in AGI, who fall in the phase-in region of
the refundable credit, where benefits are a function of earnings. Refundability would not
affect marginal tax rates for single parents with $3,000 to $15,000 in AGI but would increase
marginal tax rates by 1.5 percentage points for taxpayers with $15,000 to $25,000 in AGI
and by 11.5 percentage points for taxpayers with $25,000 to $33,000 in AGI.
Marginal tax rates for married parents with two eligible dependents, no older children,
and the maximum qualifying child care expenditures, depicted in the right panel of Figure 2,
exhibit a similar pattern. Married parents with less than $12,000 in AGI face marginal tax
rates as low as –0.45 and –0.63 under the nonrefundable and a refundable CDCC, respec-
tively. Making the CDCC permanently refundable would increase marginal tax rates among
9In the online appendix, I show that the pattern of results is similar for single parents with two eligible
dependents and married parents with one eligible dependent.
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moderate-income households already facing relatively high marginal tax rates. In particular,
marginal tax rates would increase from 0.23 to 0.36 among households with about $37,000
to $43,000 in AGI.
Figure 2 implies that intensive margin labor supply incentives of making the CDCC
permanently refundable depend on the region of the credit in which taxpayers fall. Because
a refundable CDCC would subsidize earnings for single taxpayers with less than $3,000
in AGI and married taxpayers with less than $6,000 in AGI, very-low-income households
experience a positive substitution effect that encourages work hours and a negative income
effect that discourages work hours. Weakly positive income and substitution effects among
taxpayers on the phase-out region of the refundable CDCC discourage intensive margin labor
supply.
4. Effects across the Distribution of Taxpayers
Given different effects of refundability across the income distribution shown in Sections 2
and 3, I now study the extent to which actual taxpayers would benefit from a permanently
refundable CDCC. To do so, I account for taxpayer characteristics and child care spending
using data from Wave 1 of the 2018 SIPP. The data allow me to estimate CDCC eligibility
rates by family structure and race and to simulate how permanent refundability would affect
CDCC benefits and marginal tax rates across households that face different child care and
labor supply incentives.
The SIPP is a nationally representative survey of about 45,000 households. Wave 1 of
the 2018 SIPP was administered during 2018 and documents individuals’ demographics and
economic outcomes, including their child care expenses and income from various sources,
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as of 2017. Specifically, I observe monthly individual earnings, as well as annual household
income from rent, alimony, retirement, Social Security, and a number of assets. I also
observe household child care expenses as of December 2017. When I study CDCC outcomes,
I assume that child care expenses remain constant throughout the year. This likely yields an
underestimate of annual child care expenses, as parents are more likely to rely on child care
during the summer (Capizzano, Adelman, and Stagner 2002). In this case, I underestimate
households’ potential CDCC benefits and any changes in benefits that would occur if the
credit were made permanently refundable.
To isolate the population most affected by the CDCC, I limit the sample to households
with children younger than 13. There are about 5,500 households in the sample. I use infor-
mation on income, demographics, and child care expenses to estimate households’ potential
nonrefundable federal CDCC benefits—the benefits that they would receive if they claimed
the credit—using TAXSIM.10 In doing so, I estimate CDCC benefits that respondents would
have received using 2020 tax parameters, but estimates using 2017 tax parameters are nearly
identical.11
Table 2 documents the proportion of single and married parents by eligibility status under
the nonrefundable CDCC using sample weights. The table shows that 15 percent of single
parents and 19 percent of married parents are eligible for nonrefundable CDCC benefits.
About 5 percent of single parents have incomes too low to qualify for the nonrefundable
10I assume that effects of capital gains, property income other than rent, fellowship income, state income
tax refunds, real estate and motor vehicle taxes paid, deductible medical expenses, home mortgage interest,
charitable contributions, and casualty or theft losses on CDCC benefits are neglible. I also assume that
among taxpayers with two or more children and over $3,000 in child care expenditures, child care spending
is not disproportionately allocated toward one child to the point that it decreases potential benefits. This
assumption would be violated if, for example, a household spent $5,000 on child care for its first child and
$2,000 on child care for its second child.
11Results available upon request.
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CDCC but would become eligible if the credit were made permanently refundable. Another
56 percent of single parents would gain eligibility if refundability led them to pay for child
care. The remaining 25 percent of single parents do not work and have incomes too low to
qualify for the nonrefundable CDCC. Among married parents, 10 percent have incomes too
low to qualify for the nonrefundable CDCC, but virtually none of these households pay for
child care and, therefore, would remain ineligible under a refundable credit. Most married
parents are ineligible for the CDCC because they do not pay for child care or one of the
parents does not work.
Similarly, Table 3 documents CDCC eligibility rates by the race of the mother or single
father.12 The table shows that Black and Hispanic households, which tend to have lower
incomes, are less likely than white households to be eligible for the nonrefundable CDCC.
Whereas 21 percent of white households are eligible, only 17 percent of Black households and
13 percent of Hispanic households are eligible. Making the CDCC permanently refundable
would increase eligibility by about 3 percentage points among Black households, by about
2 percentage points among Hispanic households, and by about 1 percentage point among
white households. Another 14 percent of Black households, 8 percent of Hispanic households,
and 7 percent of white households have incomes too low to qualify for the nonrefundable
CDCC but would become eligible if refundability led them to pay for child care. Table 3
suggests permanent CDCC refundability would decrease eligibility gaps between whites and
underrepresented groups.13
Next, I study how potential CDCC benefits and marginal tax rates would change if the
12Race categories are defined as white non-Hispanic, Black alone, white Hispanic, and other.
13In the online appendix, I document CDCC eligibility by number of eligible dependents. I find that
households with two or more eligible children are more likely to pay for child care and to be eligible for the
nonrefundable CDCC.
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CDCC were made permanently refundable among parents who currently work and pay for
child care, all else equal. To study outcomes separately across working households that face
different incentives due to the CDCC, I assign households to the ineligible, phase-in, or phase-
out/plateau regions of the nonrefundable credit. As in Section 3, I simulate marginal tax
rates with respect to income as a consequence of family tax benefits and individual income
taxes using 2020 tax code provisions and TAXSIM. I also use 2020 tax code provisions
and TAXSIM to simulate marginal tax rates with respect to child care expenditures as a
consequence of the CDCC.14
Table 4 displays the average number of eligible dependents, child care expenditures, AGI,
potential CDCC benefits, and marginal tax rates with respect to income and child care ex-
penditures among working single parents with child care expenses using sample weights. The
table shows that 23 percent of these parents fall in the ineligible region of the nonrefundable
CDCC, another 23 percent fall in the phase-in region, and the remaining 54 percent fall in
the phase-out/plateau region. About 60 percent of households in the ineligible and phase-in
regions and about 45 percent of households in the phase-out/plateau region have two or
more eligible dependents. Despite having low income levels, households in the ineligible and
phase-in regions on average spend about $6,000 and $11,000 per year, respectively, on child
care.15 While households on the phase-out/plateau region have similar average child care
expenditures as households on the phase-in region, their average income, nearly $70,000, is
quite high compared to average incomes in the other credit regions.
Table 4 shows that, as expected, if the CDCC were made permanently refundable, average
14Details of the simulation procedure can be found in the online appendix.
15Note that welfare income and in-kind transfers are non-taxable and not included in AGI.
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potential CDCC benefits would increase in the ineligible and phase-in regions but not in the
phase-out/plateau region of the nonrefundable credit. In particular, average annual potential
CDCC benefits would increase from $0 to $1,037 in the ineligible region and from $617 to
$1,249 in the phase-in region, all else equal. These increases are substantial: in the ineligible
region, the increase constitutes 18 percent of existing child care spending and 10 percent of
AGI. In the phase-in region, it constitutes 6 percent of child care spending and 3 percent of
AGI.
Consistent with evidence from Section 3, benefit increases affect marginal tax rates as a
consequence of family tax benefits and individual income tax, all else equal. In the ineligible
region, the average marginal tax rate with respect to income decreases from –0.22 to –0.27,
and the average marginal tax rate with respect to child care expenditures decreases from
0 to –0.16. In the phase-in and phase-out/plateau regions, the average marginal tax rate
with respect to income increases by 0.02. At the same time, average marginal tax rates
with respect to child care expenditures decrease by 0.09 and 0.04 in the phase-in and phase-
out/plateau regions, respectively. Thus, to the extent that child care costs present a barrier
to work among moderate-income households, decreases in the marginal cost of child care
could mitigate work disincentives of small increases in marginal tax rates with respect to
income.
Among married parents, approximately 1 percent fall in the ineligible region of the non-
refundable CDCC, and about 4 percent fall in the phase-in region. In the online appendix,
I show that making the CDCC permanently refundable would increase average potential
CDCC benefits by $160 per year among married parents in the phase-in region, all else
equal.
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5. How Would Permanent Refundability Affect Government Spending?
In addition to affecting taxpayers, CDCC benefit increases under refundability would increase
government spending. To understand how permanent refundability would affect government
spending, I first use sample weights to estimate the number of working households with
eligible dependents and child care expenditures that fall in each credit region. Next, I
multiply the number of households in a given credit region by that region’s increase in average
potential CDCC benefits. For example, I multiply the 460,000 single households in the
ineligible region by the $1,042 increase in CDCC benefits shown in Table 4. Summing across
credit regions, as well as across single and married households, I find that if all households
with benefit increases were to claim the CDCC, making it permanently refundable would
increase government spending annually by about $800 million, all else equal. This constitutes
a 22 percent increase in CDCC spending compared to that during the late 2010s.
Although an $800 million increase in spending is considerable relative to recent years, it
would restore spending levels that have decreased in real value over time, as the CDCC is
not indexed to inflation. The left panel of Figure 3 displays federal CDCC spending in real
and nominal dollars from 1996 to 2017. Consistent with increases in the maximum benefit,
the 2003 expansion increased CDCC spending from $2.7 billion to $3.2 billion, or from $3.8
billion to $4.5 billion in 2019 dollars. Although CDCC spending increased in nominal terms
between 2003 and 2017, real CDCC spending decreased to $3.9 billion, despite increases in
households’ child care expenditures on average (Herbst 2018). Hence, if the CDCC were
made permanently refundable, real spending would increase to levels only slightly higher
than those in 2003, all else equal.
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Decreases in real government spending over time correspond to decreases in the real value
of CDCC benefits that taxpayers receive. The right panel of Figure 3 displays maximum
effective CDCC benefits for single taxpayers with two or more eligible dependents from 1996
to 2019 in real and nominal dollars. The panel shows that the 2003 expansion increased
the maximum effective CDCC benefit from about $1,050 to $1,650, or from $1,500 to $2,300
in 2019 dollars. Because the tax filing thresholds increased each year from 2003 to 2017,
however, the nominal maximum CDCC decreased over time, and its real value decreased
by an even larger amount. By 2019, the maximum real CDCC, about $1,550, was only
slightly higher than the maximum real benefit just before the 2003 expansion. If the CDCC
were made permanently refundable, the nominal maximum effective benefit would remain
constant at $2,100, which would slow its decline in real value. Nonetheless, the credit’s
value will continue to erode over time unless its parameters are indexed to inflation. Annual
adjustments to the maximum CDCC benefit and qualified child care expenditures, as well
as the income threshold at which benefits begin to phase out, would allow the CDCC to
remain a meaningful tax program in the long run.
6. State CDCC Benefits
Because states with CDCC programs generally calculate their benefits as a percent of the
federal credit or the child care expenses used to calculate it, making the federal CDCC perma-
nently refundable may yield different effects on benefits and marginal tax rates across states.
I therefore study effects of refundability on benefits and marginal tax rates as a consequence
of both state and federal CDCCs in two states with typical state CDCC programs—Iowa,
which offers a refundable credit, and Rhode Island, which offers a nonrefundable credit.
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Specifically, Iowa’s refundable CDCC is available to taxpayers with less than $45,000 in
AGI. Those with less than $10,000 in AGI receive 75 percent of the federal CDCC that
they would receive if it were refundable. Benefits decrease with income for taxpayers with
more than $10,000 in AGI so that those with $40,000 to $45,000 receive 30 percent of the
“allowable” federal CDCC. Rhode Island’s nonrefundable CDCC is available to taxpayers
regardless of income and is worth 25 percent of the federal CDCC received after accounting
for nonrefundability.
The left panel of Figure 4 documents maximum total state and federal CDCC benefit
schedules in Iowa with and without federal CDCC refundability as of 2020. The solid red
line displays total benefits for taxpayers with two or more eligible dependents under the
nonrefundable federal CDCC. The figure shows that Iowa taxpayers with incomes too low
to qualify for the nonrefundable federal credit still may receive over $1,500 in refundable
state CDCC benefits. As expected, total CDCC benefits begin to decrease with income
at $10,000 in AGI but increase once income reaches the tax filing threshold and taxpayers
become eligible for the federal CDCC. Maximum total benefits peak at about $2,300 for
taxpayers with $34,000 in AGI; benefits then decrease with income. In particular, benefits
decrease substantially at $45,000 in AGI, where taxpayers are no longer eligible for the state
CDCC.
The solid blue line in the left panel of Figure 4 displays total CDCC benefits for Iowa
taxpayers with two or more eligible dependents if the federal CDCC were made permanently
refundable. As expected, the difference between the blue and red lines is completely ex-
plained by the increase in federal CDCC benefits under refundability shown in Figure 1.
The panel also shows that if the federal CDCC were made permanently refundable, low-
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income taxpayers in Iowa could receive over $3,600 per year in total CDCC benefits. Total
CDCC benefits for Iowa taxpayers with one eligible dependent are less generous, but the
pattern of results is otherwise similar.
Turning to Rhode Island, the right panel of Figure 4 shows that, unsurprisingly, taxpay-
ers without federal tax liability receive neither state nor federal CDCC benefits under the
nonrefundable federal CDCC. Taxpayers with higher incomes, however, benefit from both
the state and federal CDCC; total benefits for taxpayers with two or more eligible depen-
dents peak at about $1,900 for taxpayers with $34,100 in AGI. If the federal CDCC were
made permanently refundable, taxpayers with two or more eligible dependents and less than
$25,500 in AGI would receive federal but not state CDCC benefits, as they do not have
positive state tax liability. Total CDCC benefits then increase sharply as state tax liabil-
ity increases. Rhode Island taxpayers with two or more eligible dependents and $25,700 to
$34,000 in AGI experience increases in both state and federal CDCC benefits under refund-
ability, which increases the maximum total benefit to about $2,200 at $26,000 in AGI. The
pattern of results for Rhode Island taxpayers with one eligible dependent is similar.
Because increases in CDCC generosity generate complex changes in intensive margin
labor supply incentives, as in Section 3, I examine how permanent refundability would affect
marginal tax rates among taxpayers in Iowa and Rhode Island. Specifically, I simulate
marginal tax rates as a consequence of state and federal individual income taxes and state
and federal family tax benefits with and without refundability as of 2020 in Figure 5. The
top and bottom left panels of the figure document marginal tax rates in Iowa for single
parents with one eligible dependent and for married parents with two eligible dependents,
respectively. The solid lines display marginal tax rates under the nonrefundable federal
20
CDCC, and the dashed lines display marginal tax rates under a refundable CDCC. The
left panels show that accounting for state individual income taxes and family tax benefits
yields lower marginal tax rates among low-income taxpayers and higher marginal tax rates
among moderate-income taxpayers. For instance, Iowa single taxpayers with one eligible
dependent and $3,000 or less in AGI face marginal tax rates as low as –0.43 and –0.78 with
and without federal CDCC refundability, respectively, whereas similar taxpayers with about
$33,000 to $42,000 face marginal tax rates around 0.40, regardless of refundability. Because
a permanently refundable federal CDCC would not affect state CDCC benefits in Iowa,
changes in marginal tax rates due to federal CDCC refundability are equivalent to those
shown in Figure 2 for both single and married taxpayers.
Similarly, the top and bottom right panels of Figure 5 characterize marginal tax rates for
single taxpayers with one eligible dependent and married taxpayers with two eligible depen-
dents in Rhode Island. The right panels show that at low income levels, accounting for state
individual income taxes and family tax benefits largely does not affect marginal tax rates.
Given that low-income taxpayers do not benefit from Rhode Island’s CDCC, it is unsurpris-
ing that, among taxpayers with less than about $20,000, changes in marginal tax rates under
a refundable federal CDCC are equivalent to those depicted in Figure 2. The sharp increase
in state CDCC benefits as Rhode Island taxpayers begin to have positive state tax liability
and to receive state CDCC benefits shown in Figure 4, however, generates a substantial
decrease in marginal tax rates for taxpayers within a small income bin. Specifically, the
marginal tax rate among single taxpayers with one eligible dependent and about $21,500 in
AGI decreases from 0.22 to –0.70, and the marginal tax rate among married taxpayers with
two eligible dependents and about $34,000 in AGI decreases from 0.27 to –0.62. Changes in
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marginal tax rates due to federal CDCC refundability among higher-income taxpayers are
similar to those shown in Figure 2. For example, marginal tax rates increase from 0.22 to
0.36 for Rhode Island single taxpayers with one eligible dependent and $25,000 to $27,500 in
AGI and from 0.31 to 0.44 for married taxpayers with two eligible dependents and $39,000
to $43,000 in AGI.
Figures 4 and 5 imply that in states with refundable CDCCs, making the federal CDCC
permanently refundable is unlikely to change state CDCC benefits or to differentially affect
incentives. In states with nonrefunable CDCCs, making the federal CDCC permanently
refundable may lead to small increases in state CDCC benefits. Discontinuities in the total
CDCC benefit schedule under federal CDCC refundability also could generate sharp de-
creases in marginal tax rates for some taxpayers. For most taxpayers, however, changes in
marginal tax rates are likely to remain similar when accounting for state individual income
taxes and family tax benefits.
7. Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, I show that making the CDCC permanently refundable would increase eligi-
bility and benefits among low-income taxpayers, who do not tend to benefit from other child
care subsidy programs, such as dependent care FSAs. Furthermore, refundability would lead
to particularly large increases in eligibility among Black and Hispanic households, which are
relatively unlikely to qualify for the nonrefundable CDCC. Turning to intensive margin labor
supply incentives, refundability would decrease marginal tax rates with respect to income
among very-low-income taxpayers. Moderate-income taxpayers would experience small in-
creases in marginal tax rates with respect to income but decreases in marginal tax rates with
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respect to child care expenditures.
Making the CDCC permanently refundable would make the credit more similar to the
EITC by transferring income toward low-income working families. Figure 6 compares max-
imum refundable CDCC and EITC benefit schedules as of 2020 for households with one,
two, and three or more children by AGI. While EITC benefits are more generous, refundable
CDCC and EITC benefits phase in at similar rates for low-income households. The refund-
able CDCC phases out at a much lower rate relative to the EITC (and never phases out
completely), though the CDCC’s maximum plateau and phase-out regions begin at lower
income levels. More specifically, for households with two or more children, the EITC phase-
out rate (0.21) is considerably higher than both the refundable CDCC phase-out rate (0.03)
and the average marginal tax rate increase among households currently on the phase-in and
phase-out/plateau regions of the nonrefundable CDCC (0.02).
Despite relatively high marginal tax rates in the phase-out region of the EITC, researchers
show that EITC benefits increase work participation among single mothers (Eissa and Lieb-
man 1996; Hoynes and Patel 2018; Keane and Moffitt 1998; Meyer and Rosenbaum 2001;
Michelmore and Pilkauskas, forthcoming) and that decreases in labor supply among taxpay-
ers on the phase-out region are relatively small (Chetty, Friedman, and Saez 2013). Hence,
evidence from research on the EITC, along with the relatively small increases in marginal
tax rates due to refundability shown in Table 4, suggests that making the CDCC perma-
nently refundable would increase work among low-income parents who are willing to pay for
child care. Evidence that increases in CDCC generosity increase paid child care use (Miller
and Mumford 2015; Pepin 2020) corroborates the idea that a permanenty refundable CDCC
likely would increase both work and child care spending among low-income parents.
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While I show that making the CDCC permanently refundable generally would encourage
work and child care spending, additional research is needed to understand how increases in
eligibility and benefits would affect taxpayers’ behavior. Characterizing the extent to which
increases in CDCC generosity among low-income taxpayers induce parents to pay for child
care and to enter the labor force will allow policymakers to better understand the costs and
benefits of altering CDCC policies, such as refundability.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Tax Benefits for Single Taxpayers with Two Eligible Dependents by Income
$10,000 $40,000 $70,000
Federal taxable income $0 $21,191 $51,191
Nonrefundable CDCC $0 $1,320 $1,200
Refundable CDCC $2,100 $1,320 $1,200
Nonrefundable CTC $0 $909 $4,000
ACTC $1,125 $2,800 $0
CTC loss from nonrefundable CDCC $0 $291 $0
Potential FSA benefits $500 $600 $1,100
EITC $4,000 $1,655 $0
Notes: Federal taxable income and benefits for single households with two eligible depen-
dents, no additional children, and the maximum qualifying child care expenditures as of
2020. Results shown for tax-minimizing households with $10,000, $40,000, and $70,000 of
income that comes solely from earnings. “CTC loss from nonrefundable CDCC” notes the
additional CTC benefits that the taxpayer would receive under a refundable CDCC. “Poten-
tial FSA benefits” are the maximum dependent care FSA benefits that the household can
receive if their employer offers an FSA.
Source: Author’s calculations using federal tax forms.
Table 2: Proportion of Households by Marital Status and Eligibility Status
Eligibility status Single Married
Eligible 0.15 0.19
Ineligible
No child care expenditures 0.36 0.42
No earnings 0.00 0.03
Low income 0.05 0.00
No child care expenditures and no earnings 0.00 0.25
No child care expenditures and low income 0.20 0.01
No earnings and low income 0.02 0.00
No earnings, no child care expenditures, and low income 0.23 0.09
Total 1.01 0.99
Observations 1,985 3,465
Representative of 10,087,672 17,935,792
Notes: Proportion of households with eligible dependents, by marital status and eligibility
status for the nonrefundable CDCC.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 20 40 60 80 100
Federal AGI ($1,000s)
1 Child - Nonrefundable 2+ Children - Nonrefundable
1 Child - Refundable 2+ Children - Refundable
Notes: Maximum federal CDCC benefits for households with one or two or more eligible
dependents with and without refundability as of 2020.
Source: Author’s calculations using federal tax forms.
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0 20 40 60 80 100
Federal AGI ($1,000s)
Married with 2 Children
Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC
Notes: Left panel: Marginal tax rates with respect to earnings due to federal CDCC, CTC,
and EITC benefits and federal individual income taxes among single parents with one eligible
dependent and no older children with and without refundability as of 2020. Right panel:
Marginal tax rates with respect to the lesser earner’s earnings due to the federal CDCC, CTC,
EITC, and individual income taxes among married parents with two eligible dependents, no
older children, and equal earnings with and without refundability as of 2020.
Source: Author’s calculations using TAXSIM and federal tax forms.
30














































1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020
Nominal Real ($2019)
Notes: Left panel: Federal CDCC spending in real and nominal dollars from 1996-2017.
Right panel: Maximum federal CDCC benefits in real and nominal dollars from 1996-2019.
Source: Left panel: Author’s calculations using IRS SOI data. Right panel: Author’s calcu-
lations using federal tax forms.
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Federal AGI ($1,000s)
Rhode Island
1 Child - Nonrefundable 2+ Children - Nonrefundable
1 Child - Refundable 2+ Children - Refundable
Notes: Left panel: Maximum state and federal CDCC benefits for households with one or
two or more eligible dependents in Iowa with and without refundability as of 2020. Right
panel: Maximum state and federal CDCC benefits for households with one or two or more
eligible dependents in Rhode Island with and without refundability as of 2020.
Source: Author’s calculations using state and federal tax forms.
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0 20 40 60 80 100
Federal AGI ($1,000s)
Rhode Island - Married 2 Children
Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC
Notes: Top left panel: Marginal tax rates with respect to earnings due to state and fed-
eral CDCC, CTC, and EITC benefits and state and federal individual income taxes among
single parents with one eligible dependent and no older children in Iowa with and without
refundability as of 2020. Bottom left panel: Marginal tax rates with respect to earnings
due to state and federal CDCC, CTC, and EITC benefits and state and federal individual
income taxes among married parents with two eligible dependents and no older children in
Iowa with and without refundability as of 2020. Top right panel: Marginal tax rates with
respect to earnings due to state and federal CDCC, CTC, and EITC benefits and state and
federal individual income taxes among single parents with one eligible dependent and no
older children in Rhode Island with and without refundability as of 2020. Bottom right
panel: Marginal tax rates with respect to earnings due to state and federal CDCC, CTC,
and EITC benefits and state and federal individual income taxes among married parents
with two eligible dependents and no older children in Rhode Island with and without re-
fundability as of 2020.
Source: Author’s calculations using TAXSIM and state and federal tax forms.
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CDCC - 1 Child CDCC - 2+ Children
EITC - 1 Child EITC - 2 Children
EITC - 3+ Children
Notes: Maximum refundable federal CDCC and EITC benefits for households with one, two,
and three or more children as of 2020.
Source: Author’s calculations using federal tax forms.
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A1. Section 3 Simulation Procedure
To estimate marginal tax rates as a consequence of individual income taxes and family tax
benets under current tax law, I rst simulate family tax benets for households with $0 to
$100,000 in income in $100 increments using TAXSIM. I then take the dierence in family
tax benets across consecutive $100 income levels for single and married parents separately.
For example, I subtract family tax benets for single parents with one child and $10,000
in AGI from family tax benets for single parents with one child and $10,100 in AGI. This
number, divided by 100, as family tax benets are subsidies, is the marginal tax rate as a
consequence of family tax benets.1 Finally, I add marginal tax rates as a consequence of
family tax benets to marginal tax rates as a consequence of individual income taxes based
on households' AGI.
To estimate marginal tax rates under a refundable CDCC, I use a similar procedure
but calculate refundable CDCC benets using parameters from the tax code, as TAXSIM
only estimates tax benets under current tax law. Additionally, because refundable tax
credits currently come after nonrefundable tax credits on federal Form 1040, I assume that
a refundable CDCC would not aect tax liability used to calculate CTC benets. Hence,
making the CDCC refundable could lead to increases in CTC benets. To estimate CTC
benets under a refundable CDCC, I simulate tax benets for households without child
care spending (who do not qualify for the CDCC) using TAXSIM and assign those benets
1
This procedure does not yield accurate marginal tax rates for households at the income increments 
adjacent to kinks in the family tax schedule. I assign households on the left side of a nonlinearity in the tax 
schedule the marginal tax rate faced by households with $100 less in AGI. I assign households on the right side of a 
nonlinearity in the tax schedule the marginal tax rate faced by households with $100 more in AGI. I then assign 
households that fall between two income increments with dierent marginal tax rates the rate faced by households at 
the closest income increment.
1
to otherwise similar households that pay for child care. I then add CTC benets in the absence of
CDCC benets to refundable CDCC and EITC benets, take dierences in family tax benets 
across income increments, divide by  100, and add marginal tax rates as a consequence of 
individual income taxes.
A2. Section 4 Simulation Procedure
If the household currently is ineligible for CDCC benets, I assign it to the ineligible region. 
If the household is eligible for the CDCC, I estimate its potential CDCC benets had the 
lower-earning parent earned an additional $1 during 2017, all else equal, using TAXSIM. If 
the household's CDCC benet increases with income, I assign it to the phase-in region. If 
the household's potential CDCC benet decreases with income or does not change, I assign 
it to the phase-out/plateau region.
To estimate each household's marginal tax rate with respect to income as a consequence 
of federal CDCC benets and individual income tax, I rst multiply the change in CDCC 
benets due to an additional $1 of income by 1, as the CDCC is a subsidy. I then add the 
marginal tax rate as a consequence of CDCC benets to the household's individual income 
tax rate based on AGI. Next, I use a similar procedure to estimate each household's marginal 
tax rate with respect to child care expenditures as a consequence of the federal CDCC. 
That is, I use TAXSIM to estimate potential CDCC benets for each household, had the 
household spent an additional $1 on child care during 2017, all else equal. I then multiply 
the change in benets due to the additional $1 by 1 to obtain the household's marginal tax 
rate with respect to child care expenditures. Finally, to estimate potential CDCC benets 
and marginal tax rates under a refundable CDCC, all else equal, I use similar procedures
2
but, as in Section 3, estimate refundable CDCC benets using parameters from the tax code.
A3. Tables and Figures
Table A1: Proportion of Households by Number of Eligible Dependents and Eligibility Status
Eligibility status 1 child 2+ children
Eligible 0.14 0.21
Ineligible
No child care expenditures 0.45 0.35
No earnings 0.01 0.03
Low income 0.02 0.02
No child care expenditures and no earnings 0.14 0.18
No child care expenditures and low income 0.09 0.07
No earnings and low income 0.01 0.01
No earnings, no child care expenditures, and low income 0.15 0.13
Total 1.01 1.00
Observations 2,538 2,912
Representative of 13,341,499 14,681,967
Notes: Proportion of households with eligible dependents, by number of eligible dependents
and eligibility status for the nonrefundable CDCC.















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 20 40 60 80 100
Federal AGI ($1,000s)
1 Child - Nonrefundable 2+ Children - Nonrefundable
1 Child - Refundable 2+ Children - Refundable
Notes: Maximum federal CDCC benets for married households with one or two or more
eligible dependents and equal earnings with and without refundability as of 2020.
Source: Author's calculations using federal tax forms.
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Federal AGI ($1,000s)
$1,000 - Nonrefundable $2,000 - Nonrefundable
$1,000 - Refundable $2,000 - Refundable
Notes: Federal CDCC benets for single households with one eligible dependent and $1,000
or $2,000 in child care expenditures with and without refundability as of 2020.
Source: Author's calculations using federal tax forms.
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Figure A3: Maximum Federal CDCC Benets by Federal AGI for Married Parents with
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Federal AGI ($1,000s)
$2,000 - Nonrefundable $4,000 - Nonrefundable
$2,000 - Refundable $4,000 - Refundable
Notes: Federal CDCC benets for married households with two or more eligible dependents,
$2,000 or $4,000 in child care expenditures, and equal earnings with and without refundability
as of 2020.
Source: Author's calculations using federal tax forms.
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Figure A4: Marginal Tax Rates due to Federal CDCC, CTC, EITC, and Individual Income
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Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC
Notes: Marginal tax rates with respect to earnings due to federal CDCC, CTC, and EITC
benets and federal individual income taxes among single parents with two eligible depen-
dents and no older children with and without refundability as of 2020.
Source: Author's calculations using TAXSIM.
8
Figure A5: Marginal Tax Rates due to Federal CDCC, CTC, EITC, and Individual Income
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Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC
Notes: Marginal tax rates with respect to the lesser earner's earnings due to federal CDCC,
CTC, and EITC benets and federal individual income taxes among married parents with
one eligible dependent, no older children, and equal earnings with and without refundability
as of 2020.
Source: Author's calculations using TAXSIM.
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Figure A6: Marginal Tax Rates due to Federal CDCC, CTC, EITC, and Individual Income
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Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC
Notes: Marginal tax rates with respect to the lesser earner's earnings due to federal CDCC,
CTC, and EITC benets and federal individual income taxes among married parents with
one eligible dependent and no older children with and without refundability as of 2020, where
one spouse garners 75 percent of household earnings.
Source: Author's calculations using TAXSIM.
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Figure A7: Marginal Tax Rates due to Federal CDCC, CTC, EITC, and Individual Income
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Nonrefundable CDCC Refundable CDCC
Notes: Marginal tax rates with respect to the lesser earner's earnings due to federal CDCC,
CTC, and EITC benets and federal individual income taxes among married parents with
two eligible dependents and no older children with and without refundability as of 2020,
where one spouse garners 75 percent of household earnings.
Source: Author's calculations using TAXSIM.
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